Nuovo DRM Paradiso: Towards a Verified Fair DRM Scheme by Dashti, Muhammad Torabi et al.
Nuovo DRM Paradiso:
Towards a Veriﬁed Fair DRM Scheme
M. Torabi Dashti1, S. Krishnan Nair2, and H.L. Jonker3
1 CWI Amsterdam
dashti@cwi.nl
2 Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
srijith@few.vu.nl
3 Technische Universiteit Eindhoven
hjonker@win.tue.nl
Abstract. We formally specify the recent DRM scheme of Nair et al.
in the μcrl process algebraic language. The security requirements of
the scheme are formalized and using them as the basis, the scheme is
veriﬁed. The veriﬁcation shows the presence of security weaknesses in the
original protocols, which are then addressed in our proposed extension
to the scheme. A ﬁnite model of the extended scheme is subsequently
model checked and shown to satisfy its design requirements, including
secrecy, fairness and resisting content masquerading. Our analysis was
distributed over a cluster of machines, allowing us to check the whole
extended scheme despite its complexity and high non-determinacy.
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a rapid increase in the popularity of personal devices
capable of rendering digital contents. Large content providers as well as inde-
pendent artists are looking forward to these new opportunities for selling their
copyrighted materials, necessitating the development of systems to protect digi-
tal contents from illegal access and unauthorized distribution. Technologies used
to enforce policies controlling usage of digital contents are referred to as Digital
Rights Management (DRM) techniques. A major challenge in DRM is enforcing
the policies after contents have been distributed to consumers. This problem is
currently addressed by limiting the distribution of protected contents only to
the so-called compliant devices (e.g. iPods), that by construction are guaranteed
to always enforce the DRM policies associated with the contents they render.
A unique concept of DRM-preserving content redistribution was proposed
in [1], hereafter called NPGCT scheme, where users act also as content redis-
tributors. This potentially allows consumers to not only buy the rights to use
a content, but also to redistribute the content in a controlled manner. From a
security point of view, this is technically challenging, since the resulting system
forms a peer-to-peer network of independent devices, each of them a consumer,
an authorized distributor, and also a potential attacker. Recent sobering expe-
rience [2] has shown that DRM techniques are inherently complicated and if
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carelessly enforced can infringe on customers’, as well as vendors’, rights. These
serve as motivation for using formal methods to verify the NPGCT scheme to
provide both content vendors and customers a certain degree of conﬁdence in
the security and fairness of the system.
Contributions. Our contribution in this paper is twofold. First, on the security
side, we formally specify the NPGCT protocols and analyze them. Our analysis
reveals two security ﬂaws in the scheme. We then propose an extended scheme,
dubbed Nuovo DRM, to address these issues. A formal speciﬁcation and veri-
ﬁcation of Nuovo DRM is subsequently presented and (a ﬁnite model of) the
scheme is shown to indeed achieve its design goals.
Second, we use state-of-the-art formal tools and techniques to handle the
veriﬁcation problem of DRM schemes. We use the μcrl process algebraic lan-
guage [3] and toolset [4] to specify the protocol participants and the intruder
model. Due to the complexity and sheer size of the schemes, we resorted to a
distributed instantiation of the toolset [5] to generate and minimize the corre-
sponding state spaces. In particular, since the Nuovo DRM scheme is highly
non-deterministic due to the presence of several fall-back scenarios, with the
inclusion of an intruder model to the system, it easily runs into the limits of
single-machine state space generation. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the ﬁrst to formally verify a whole DRM scheme. Moreover, we adapt the stan-
dard formal model of intruder, namely the Dolev-Yao model [6], to reﬂect the
restricted behavior of compliant devices in DRM systems.
Related work. Nuovo DRM contains an optimistic fair exchange protocol. Op-
timistic fair exchange protocols have been introduced in [7] and since then have
attracted much attention. The closest fair exchange protocol to our scheme is
perhaps the probabilistic synchronous protocol of [8], as it relies on trusted com-
puting devices in exchange. In contrast to [8], we present a deterministic asyn-
chronous protocol that achieves strong (as opposed to probabilistic) fairness,
but, as a drawback, relies on impartial agents to secure unsupervised exchanges.
In this paper we do not address modeling semantics and derivations of rights
associated with DRM-protected contents, which constitutes a whole separate
body of research, e.g. see [9]. We focus on formal analysis of transactional prop-
erties of DRM schemes. Related to this, there are several papers on model check-
ing (usually small instances of) optimistic fair exchange protocols, e.g. [10,11,12].
What makes our study unique is the size of the system that is automatically an-
alyzed here, as well as, capturing some DRM-speciﬁc features of the system, e.g.
compliant devices, in the model. Constraint solving for checking fair exchange
protocols has been proposed in [13]. This can detect type-ﬂaw attacks, but is
restricted to checking safety properties. Theorem-proving approaches to check-
ing fairness of protocols [14,15,16] can provide a complete security proof at the
cost of heavy human intervention, and thus cannot be easily integrated in the
protocol design phase.
Structure of the paper. We start by explaining the notations and (cryp-
tographic) assumptions used in the paper, in Section 2. Section 3 summarizes
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the NPGCT scheme, which provides the basis for our reﬁned scheme. Section 4
presents the Nuovo DRM scheme, its assumptions and its goals. Nuovo DRM
is then formally analyzed in Section 5 and shown to achieve its goals. Finally,
Section 6 concludes the paper with some possible future research directions.
2 Notations and Assumptions
Trusted devices assumptions.Compliant devices are tamper-proof hardware,
possibly operated by malicious owners, that follow only their certiﬁed software.
We assume that compliant devices are able to locally perform atomic actions:
multiple actions can be logically linked in these devices, such that either all
or none of them are executed. They also contain a limited amount of secure
scratch memory and non-volatile storage. These requirements are typically met
by current technologies (e.g. iPods). A legitimate content provider, (abusively)
referred to as trusted third party (TTP), is assumed impartial in its behavior
and eventually available to respond to requests from compliant devices.
Cryptographic assumptions. In our analysis the cryptographic operations
are assumed to be ideal a` la Dolev-Yao [6]: we assume access to a secure one-
way collision-resistant hash function h; therefore h(x) uniquely describes x. A
message m encrypted with symmetric key K is denoted {m}K , from which m
can only be extracted using K. Notations pk(X) and sk (X) denote the public
and private keys of entity X , respectively. In asymmetric encryption we have
{{m}sk(X)}pk(X) = {{m}pk(X)}sk(X) = m. Encrypting with sk(X) denotes sign-
ing and, for convenience, we let m be retrievable from {m}sk(X).
Notations. C and D denote compliant customer devices, respectively owned
by owner(C) and owner(D). P denotes a trusted legitimate content provider. A
DRM-protected content is denoted by M . The ﬁnite set of all protected contents
is denoted Cont . It is assumed that unique descriptors (e.g. hash values) of
all M ∈ Cont are publicly known. The (ﬁnite) set of all possible rights in the
protocols is denoted Rgts. The term RX(M) represents the rights of device X
for content M .
3 The NPGCT DRM Scheme
The NPGCT scheme was proposed as a DRM-preserving digital content redistri-
bution system where a consumer doubles up as a content reseller. In this section
we brieﬂy describe the NPGCT scheme and then present the results of its formal
analysis. For a detailed speciﬁcation of NPGCT see [1].
3.1 NPGCT Protocols
The scheme consists of two main protocols: the ﬁrst distributes contents from
provider P to client C, the second allows C to resell contents to another client D.
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Provider-customer protocol (P2C). The protocol is initiated by the owner
of C who wants to buy item M with rights R from provider P . From [1]:
1. C → P : Request content
2. C ↔ P : Mutual authentication, [payment]
3. P → C : {M}K , {K}pk(C), R, σ, Λ
σ=meta-data of M , Λ={h(P, C,M, σ,R)}sk(P )
Here Λ acts as a certiﬁcation that C has been granted rights R and helps in
proving C’s right to redistribute M to other clients. It also binds the meta-
data σ to the content, which prevents masquerading attacks on M .
Customer-customer protocol (C2C). This part of the protocol is initiated
by the owner of D who wants to buy M with rights R′ from C. From [1]:
1. D → C : Request content
2. C ↔ D : Mutual authentication
3. C → D : {M}K′ , {K′}pk(D), RC(M), R′, σ, Λ, Λ′
Λ′ = {h(C,D, M, σ,R′)}sk(C)
4. D : Veriﬁes σ, Λ′ and RC(M) using Λ
5. D → C : ψ, [payment]
ψ = {h(C,P, {M}K′ , σ,R′)}sk(D)
By ψ, D acknowledges that it has received M with rights R′, while Λ and Λ′
form a chain that helps to prove that D has been granted rights R′.
3.2 Formal Analysis of NPGCT
We have formally speciﬁed and model checked the NPGCT scheme. In this
section, due to space constrains, we only present the results of this analysis.
The assumptions and security goals of the scheme, their formalization, the pro-
tocol speciﬁcation toolset and the model checking technology used here are
similar to those used for Nuovo DRM, which are discussed in the following
sections. Details of this analysis along with found attack traces are available
online [17].
Two security ﬂaws in the NPGCT scheme were revealed in our analysis. First,
in the P2C (and similarly the C2C) protocol, a malicious customer could feed
rights from a previous session to the trusted device, because the authentication
phase is not extended to guarantee freshness of the content-right bundle that is
subsequently delivered. This ﬂaw allows C to accumulate rights without paying
P for it. As a remedy, fresh nonces from the authentication phase can be used
in Λ to ensure the freshness of the whole exchange, c.f. Section 4.
Second, in the C2C protocol, payment is not bound to the request/receive
messages exchanged between two customers. Thus, once D receives M in step
3, the owner of D can avoid paying C by aborting the protocol. Since this
exchange is unsupervised, the owners of compliant devices are forced to trust
each other to complete transactions. While it is reasonable to extend such trust
to a legitimate content provider, it should not be assumed for device owners in
C2C exchanges.
Nuovo DRM Paradiso: Towards a Veriﬁed Fair DRM Scheme 37
4 The Nuovo DRM Scheme
This section describes an extension to the NPGCT, dubbed Nuovo DRM, which
in particular addresses the security concerns identiﬁed in Section 3.2. Here we
conﬁne to informal descriptions; a formal speciﬁcation is discussed in Section 5.
4.1 Nuovo DRM’s Goals
We require the Nuovo DRM scheme to achieve the following goals (the same
goals as those used to analyze the NPGCT scheme in Section 3.2):
G1. Eﬀectiveness. A protocol achieves eﬀectiveness iﬀ when honest partic-
ipants run the protocol, it terminates successfully, i.e. a desired content-right
bundle is exchanged for the corresponding payment order. Eﬀectiveness is a
sanity check for the functionality of the protocol and is therefore checked in a
reliable communication system with no attacker.
G2. Secrecy. Secrecy states that no outsider may learn “secret” items, which are
usually encrypted for intended receivers. Nuovo DRM (similar to NPGCT) limits
the distribution of protected contents by encrypting them for intended compliant
devices. This scheme must thus guarantee that a DRM-protected content never
appears in plain to any non-compliant device.
G3. Resisting content masquerading. Content masquerading occurs when
content M is passed oﬀ as content M ′, for M = M ′. Preventing this attack
ensures that an intruder cannot feed M ′ to a device that has requested M .
G4. Strong fairness. Assume Alice owns mA and Bob owns mB. Informally,
strong fairness states that if Alice and Bob run a protocol to exchange their items,
ﬁnally either both or neither of them receive the other party’s item [18]. Strong
fairness usually requires the contents exchanged in the system to be strongly
generatable: in Nuovo, a content provider can provide the exact missing content
if the exchange goes amiss. Strong fairness also guarantees timeliness, which
informally states that, in a ﬁnite amount of time, honest protocol participants
can safely terminate their role in the protocol with no help from malicious parties.
As this is a liveness property1, resilient communication channels (assumption A2
below) are necessary for fairness to hold [7]. For an in-depth discussion of fairness
in exchange we refer the interested reader to [7].
4.2 Nuovo DRM’s Assumptions
Nuovo DRM is based on the following assumptions:
A1. Consumer compliant devices are assumed tamper-proof. Owners of compli-
ant devices are however untrusted. They may collude to subvert the protocol.
1 Properties of systems can be divided into two classes: safety properties, stating un-
wanted situations do not happen, and liveness properties, stipulating desired events
eventually happen. For a formal deﬁnition of these property classes see [19].
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They can, in particular, arbitrarily switch oﬀ their own devices (“crash failure
model” in distributed computing terminology).
A2. We assume an asynchronous resilient communication model with no global
clock, i.e. the communication media deliver each transmitted message intact in
a ﬁnite but unknown amount of time. Resilience is necessary when aiming for
fairness [20], and is realizable under certain reasonable assumptions [21].
A3. There exists a hierarchy of public keys, with the public key of the root
embedded in each compliant device and available to content providers. Using
such an infrastructure, a device can prove its identity or verify other devices’
identities without having to contact the root. Participant identities (C, D and P )
implicitly refer to these authentication certiﬁcates issued by the root.
A4. Protocol participants negotiate the price of content in advance. In Nuovo
DRM, the price of the content being traded is bundled with the requested rights.
4.3 Nuovo DRM Protocols
As in NPGCT, our scheme consists of two main protocols: the ﬁrst distributes
content from provider P to client C, the second allows C to resell content to
another client D.
Provider-customer protocol (P2C). The owner of C wants to buy item M
with rights R from content provider P . Here C and P , but not owner (C), are
assumed trusted.
1. owner(C) → C : P, h(M), R
2. C → P : C, nC
3. P → C : {nP , nC , C}sk(P )
4. C → P : {nC , nP , h(M), R, P}sk(C)
5. P → C : {M}K , {K}pk(C), {R, nC}sk(P )
In the ﬁrst step, the hash of the desired content, retrieved from a trusted public
directory, with a right and the identity of a legitimate provider are fed to the
compliant device C. Following assumption A4, owner(C) and P have already
reached an agreement on the price. Whether P is a legitimate provider can be
checked by C and vice versa (see assumption A3). In step 2, C generates a fresh
nonce nC and sends it to P , which will continue the protocol only if C is a
compliant device. Message 4 completes the mutual authentication between C
and P . This also constitutes a payment order from C to P . After receiving
this message, P checks if R is the same as previously agreed upon (assumption
A4) and only if so, stores the payment order (for future/immediate encashing)
and performs step 5 after generating a random fresh key K. When C receives
message 5, it decrypts {K}pk(C), extracts M and checks if it matches h(M) in
message 1, and nC is the same as the nonce in message 2. If these tests pass,
C updates RC(M) with R, e.g. R is added to RC(M). Note that RC(M) is not
necessarily R: C could already have some rights associated with M , for instance,
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acquired from an earlier purchase. Since we abstract away from rights semantics
(see our related work), the update phase is left unspeciﬁed here.
We now deﬁne a set of abstract actions to highlight important steps of the
protocol. These are used in the formalization process to deﬁne desired behav-
iors of the protocol. For the P2C protocol, C performs the abstract action
request(C, h(M), R, P ) at step 4, indicating the start of the exchange from C’s
point of view. At step 5, P performs issue(P, h(M), R, C), denoting the re-
ceipt of the payment order and sending the content to C. Finally C performs
update(C, h(M), R, P ) upon accepting message 5, denoting the successful termi-
nation of the exchange from C’s point of view. These abstract actions are further
discussed in Section 5.
Customer-customer protocol (C2C). The owner of D wants to buy item M
with rights R′ from another compliant device C. This protocol can be seen as a
fair exchange protocol where C and D want to exchange a content-right bundle
for its associated payment so that either both or none of them receive their de-
sired items. In deterministic protocols, however, achieving fairness is proved to be
impossible without a TTP [22]. Assuming that most participants are honest and
protocols go wrong infrequently, it is reasonable to use protocols which require
TTP’s intervention only when a conﬂict has to be resolved. These are usually
called optimistic fair exchange protocols [7] and contain two sub-protocols: an
optimistic sub-protocol is executed between untrusted devices, and if a partici-
pant cannot ﬁnish this protocol run, it will initiate a recovery sub-protocol with
a designated TTP.2 Our C2C protocol is an optimistic fair exchange protocol
which uses the content provider P as the TTP. The optimistic exchange sub-
protocol is as follows:
1. owner(D) → D : C, h(M), R′
2. D → C : D, nD
3. C → D : {n′C , nD, D}sk(C)
4. D → C : {nD , n′C , h(M), R′, C}sk(D)
5. C → D : {M}K′ , {K′}pk(D), {R′, nD}sk(C)
This protocol is similar to the P2C protocol and only the abstract actions
are described here: at step 4, D takes the action request(D,h(M), R′, C) when
sending out the message which represents its payment. At step 5, C performs
issue(C, h(M), R′, D) and in the same atomic action updates the right associated
with M (reﬂecting that some part of RC(M) has been used for reselling M) and
stores the payment order signed by D. Note that the atomicity of these actions is
necessary to guarantee that C does not store the payment order without simul-
taneously updating the right RC(M). Upon accepting message 5, D performs
update(D,h(M), R′, C).
2 Fair exchange is attained by ensuring either successful termination (recovery) or
failure (abortion) for both parties. In Nuovo DRM, if neither party terminates suc-
cessfully, nothing is exchanged and failure is already attained. Hence, no particular
“abort” protocol is necessary.
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In this protocol, a malicious owner(C) can abort before sending message 5
to D or this message can get lost due to a hardware failure. To prevent such
unfair situations for D, we provide a recovery mechanism to obtain the lost
content.
Recovery sub-protocol. The goal is to bring the compliant device D back to a
fair state in case of a failure in delivering message 5 in the C2C protocol. D can
start a recovery session with the content provider P at any time after sending
message 4 in the C2C protocol. If a connection with the provider is not available,
D saves the current state and simply waits till it becomes available. Once the
recovery protocol has been initiated, D ignores messages from the optimistic run
of C2C. The purpose of the recovery is to ensure that D receives the content
and rights that owner(D) wanted (and ostensibly paid for).
5r. D : resolves(D)
6r. D → P : D, n′D
7r. P → D : {n′P , n′D, D}sk(P )
8r. D → P : {n′D, n′P , 〈nD, n′C , h(M), R′, C〉, R′′, P}sk(D)
9r. P → D : {M}K′′ , {K′′}pk(D), {R′′, n′D}SK(P )
In this protocol D and P behave as if D is purchasing the M -R′′ content-right
bundle from P using the P2C protocol, except that, in message 8r, D reports the
failed C2C exchange it had with C. The following abstract actions are performed
here: request(D,h(M), R′, P ) is performed by D at step 8r. At step 9r, P per-
forms issue(P, h(M), R′, D) and upon accepting message 9r, D performs update
(D,h(M), R′, P ). The way P resolves (payments of) failed exchanges deserves de-
tailed explanation. This however falls beyond the scope of our formal analysis and,
due to space constraints, is omitted here; see [17] for a detailed discussion.
One can argue that the recovery sub-protocol may also fail due to lossy
communication channels. As a way to mitigate this, persistent communication
channels for content providers can be built, e.g., using an FTP server as an inter-
mediary. The provider would upload the content, and the device would download
it from the server. In order to guarantee fairness, such resilient communication
channels are generally unavoidable [7] (c.f. assumption A2).
As a ﬁnal note, we emphasize that only tamper-proof compliant devices are
considered here (assumption A1). These protocols can be trivially attacked if the
devices are tampered with (e.g. a corrupted D would be able to initiate a recovery
protocol even after a successful exchange). Methods for revoking circumvented
devices and resisting systematic content pirating are described in [23,1].
5 Formal Analysis
In this section we describe the steps followed to formally verify that Nuovo DRM
achieves its design goals. Our approach is based on ﬁnite-state model check-
ing [24], which (usually) requires negligible human intervention and, moreover,
produces concrete counterexamples, i.e. attack traces, if the design fails to sat-
isfy a desired property. It can therefore be eﬀectively integrated into the design
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phase. However, a complete security proof of the system cannot, in general, be
established by model checking. For an overview on formal methods for verifying
security protocols see [25]. Our formal veriﬁcation can be seen as a sequence of
steps: ﬁrst, we specify the protocol and the intruder model in the μcrl pro-
cess algebraic language and generate the corresponding model using the μcrl
toolset (version 2.17.12). Second, we state the desired properties in the regular
(alternation-free) μ-calculus, and, ﬁnally, check the protocol model with regard
to the properties in the cadp toolset. Below, these steps are described in detail.
5.1 Formal Speciﬁcation of Nuovo DRM
The complex structure of Nuovo DRM calls for an expressive speciﬁcation lan-
guage. We have formalized the Nuovo DRM scheme in μcrl, a language for spec-
ifying and verifying distributed systems and protocols in an algebraic style [3].
A μcrl speciﬁcation describes a labeled transition system (LTS), in which
states represent process terms and edges are labeled with actions. The μcrl
toolset [4,5], together with cadp [26] which acts as its back-end, features visual-
ization, simulation, symbolic reduction, (distributed) state space generation and
reduction, model checking and theorem proving capabilities.
We model a security protocol as an asynchronous composition of a ﬁnite num-
ber of non-deterministic named processes. These processes model roles of honest
participants in the protocol. Processes communicate by sending and receiving
messages. A message is a pair m = (q, c), where q is the identity of the intended
receiver process (so that the network can route the message to its destination)
and c is the content of the message. To send or receive a message m, a partici-
pant p performs the actions send(p,m) or recv(p,m), respectively. Apart from
send and recv, all other actions of processes are assumed internal, i.e. not com-
municating with other participants. These are symbolic actions that typically
denote security claims of protocol participants (e.g. update in Section 4.3). Here,
we only present a μcrl speciﬁcation of the honest customer role in the P2C
protocol. For a complete speciﬁcation of Nuovo DRM see [23]. We start with a
very short introduction to μcrl.
The μCRL speciﬁcation language. In a μcrl speciﬁcation, processes are
represented by process terms, which describe the order in which the actions may
happen in a process. A process term consists of action names and recursion vari-
ables combined by process algebraic operators. The operators ‘·’ and ‘+’ are used
for the sequential and alternative composition (“choice”) of processes, respec-
tively. The process
∑
d∈Δ P (d), where Δ is a (inﬁnite) data domain, behaves as
P (d1) + P (d2) + · · · .
The customer process. In μcrl spec 1 we specify the customer’s compliant
device role in the P2C protocol of the Nuovo DRM scheme. In this speciﬁcation,
Nonce and Key represent the ﬁnite set of nonces and keys available in the pro-
tocol, respectively. The set Ω is C’s local collection of content-right bundles, nC
denotes the nonce that is available to C in the current protocol round, and the
function nxt : Nonce → Nonce, given a seed, generates a fresh random nonce.
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To simplify the presentation we remove the identities of senders and intended
receivers from messages. Note that any discrepancy in the received content is
automatically detected in this code: in the last message, if the ﬁrst part does
not agree with the initial h(M), the message will not be accepted.
μCRL spec 1. Customer device in the P2C protocol
C(Ω, nC) =
 
R∈Rgts
M∈Cont
recv(P, h(M), R).send(C, nC).
 
n∈Nonce
recv({n, nC , C}sk(P )).
send({nC , n, h(M), R, P}sk(C)).request(C, h(M), R, C).
 
K∈Key
recv({M}K , {K}pk(C), {R, nC}sk(P )).update(C, h(M), R, P ).
C(Ω ∪ {〈M, R〉},nxt(nC))
Communication models. We consider two diﬀerent communication models.
The ﬁrst is a synchronous communication model that is used to verify the ef-
fectiveness property (goal G1). In this model there is no intruder and all par-
ticipants are honest. A process p can send a message m to q only if q at the
same time can receive it from p. The synchronization between these is denoted
com, which formalizes the “p → q : m” notation of Sections 3 and 4. In order
to verify the properties G2–G4, an asynchronous communication model is used
where the intruder has complete control over the communication media. When a
process p sends a message m with the intention that it should be received by q,
it is in fact the intruder that receives it, and it is only from the intruder that q
may receive m. The communications between participants of a protocol, via the
intruder, is thus asynchronous and, moreover, a participant has no guarantees
about the origins of the messages it receives.
Intruder model. We follow Dolev and Yao’s approach to model the intruder [6],
with some deviations that are described below. The Dolev-Yao (DY) intruder has
complete control over the network: it intercepts and remembers all transmitted
messages, it can encrypt, decrypt and sign messages if it knows the corresponding
keys, it can compose and send new messages using its knowledge and it can
remove or delay messages in favor of others being communicated. As it has
complete control over communication media, we assume it plays the role of the
communication media. All messages are thus channeled through the intruder.
Under the perfect cryptography assumption, this intruder has been shown to
be the most powerful attacker model [27]. In our formalization, this intruder
is a non-deterministic process that exhausts all possible sequences of actions,
resulting in an LTS which can subsequently be formally checked. Note that
the intruder is not necessarily an outside party: it may be a legitimate, though
malicious, player in the protocol.
The intruder model used here is diﬀerent from the DY intruder in two main
aspects (for a formal speciﬁcation of our intruder model see [23]). These diﬀer-
ences stem from the characteristics of the DRM scheme and its requirements:
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I1. Trusted devices, that play a crucial role in these protocols, signiﬁcantly limit
the power of the intruder3. However, the intruder has the ability to deliberately
turn oﬀ its (otherwise trusted) devices. This has been reﬂected in our model by
allowing the devices controlled by the intruder to non-deterministically choose
between continuing and quitting the protocol at each step, except when per-
forming atomic actions. Therefore, in the model, all non-atomic actions a of the
devices operated by the intruder are rewritten with a + oﬀ . Thus, the intruder
cannot turn compliant devices oﬀ while these devices are performing an atomic
action. We verify the protocols in the presence of this enriched intruder model
to capture possible security threats posed by these behaviors.
I2. Liveness properties of protocols can in general not be proved in the DY model,
since the intruder can block all communications. To achieve fairness, which in-
herently comprises a liveness property (see Section 4.1), optimistic fair exchange
protocols often rely on a “resilient communication channels” (RCC ) assumption,
e.g. see [28]. RCC guarantee that all transmitted messages will eventually reach
their destination, provided a recipient for them exists [7]. The behavior of our
intruder model is limited by RCC , i.e. it cannot indeﬁnitely block the network.4
Since the intruder is a non-deterministic process in our model, to exclude execu-
tions that violate RCC , we impose a fairness constraint 5 on the resulting LTS.
Besides, the action com†, used in Section 5.3, represents communications not
required by RCC. A protocol has to achieve its goals even when executions con-
taining com† actions are avoided. A formal treatment of these issues is beyond
the scope of this paper and can be found in [29].
As a minor deviation from DY, to indicate violation of the secrecy require-
ment, the intruder process performs the abstract action revealed when it gets
access to a non-encrypted version of any DRM-protected content. This action
is of course not triggered when the intruder merely renders an item using its
trusted device, which is a normal behavior in the system.
5.2 Regular μ-Calculus
The design goals of Nuovo DRM (G1-G4) are encoded in the regular μ-calculus
[30]. This logic covers the Nuovo DRM’s design goals in its entirety, both safety
and liveness, and naturally incorporates data parameters that are exchanged
in the protocols. The alternation-free fragment of the regular μ-calculus can be
eﬃciently model checked [30], and all the formulas that we have veriﬁed are in
this fragment. Below, a short account of this logic is presented.
3 In our formalization we ignore the possibility of tampering trusted devices. Coun-
termeasures for such cases are discussed in [23,1].
4 For instance, a wireless channel provides RCC for mobile devices, assuming that
jamming can only be locally sustained.
5 Two diﬀerent notions of fairness are used in this paper: fairness in exchange (see G4)
and fairness constraint of an LTS, which informally states that each process of the
system has to be given a fair chance to execute [24].
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Regular μ-calculus consists of regular formulas and state formulas. Regular
formulas, describing sets of traces, are built upon action formulas and the stan-
dard regular expression operators. We use ‘.’, ‘∨’, ‘¬’ and ‘∗’ for concatenation,
choice, complement and transitive-reﬂexive closure, respectively, of regular for-
mulas. State formulas, expressing properties of states, are built upon proposi-
tional variables, standard boolean operators, the possibility modal operator 〈· · · 〉
(used in the form 〈R〉T to express the existence of an execution of the protocol
for which the regular formula R holds), the necessity modal operator [· · · ] (used
in the form [R]F to express that, for all executions of the protocol, the regular
formula R does not hold) and the minimal and maximal ﬁxed point operators
μ and ν. A state satisﬁes μX. F iﬀ it belongs to the minimal solution of the
ﬁxed point equation X = F (X), F being a state formula and X a set of states.
The symbols F and T are used in both action formulas and state formulas. In
action formulas they represent no action and any action and in state formulas
they denote the empty set and the entire state space, respectively. The wild-card
action parameter ‘−’ represents any parameter of an action.
5.3 Analysis Results
In this section we describe the results obtained from the formal analysis of the
Nuovo DRM scheme. Our analysis has the following properties: the intruder is
allowed to have access to unbounded resources of data (like fresh nonces), should
it need them to exploit the protocol. We consider only a ﬁnite number of con-
current sessions of the protocol, i.e. each participant is provided a ﬁnite number
of fresh nonces to start new exchange sessions. Although this does not, in gen-
eral, constitute a proof of security for a protocol, in many practical situations it
suﬃces. As security of cryptographic protocols is not decidable (e.g. see [31]), a
trade-oﬀ has to be made between completeness of the proofs and their automa-
tion. Our analysis method is fully automatic. Following [6], we assume perfect
cryptography and do not consider attacks resulting from weaknesses of the cryp-
tographic apparatus used in protocols. Type-ﬂaw attacks6 are also omitted from
our analysis. These can, in any case, be easily prevented [32].
Our formal analysis consists of two scenarios. The ﬁrst veriﬁes eﬀectiveness
(G1) while using the synchronous communication model of Section 5.1. The
second scenario uses the asynchronous communication model of Section 5.1 to
verify the remaining properties (G2-G4). Both scenarios consist of two compliant
devices C and D that are controlled (but not tampered) by the intruder of
Section 5.1. Below, P , as always, represents the trusted content provider. The
formulas in the following results use abstract actions to improve the readability
of the proved theorems. These actions are explained in Sections 4.3 and 5.1. A
complete formalization of these actions can be found in [23].
Honest scenario S0: The communication network is assumed operational and
no malicious agent is present. C is ordered to buy an item from P . Then, C resells
6 A type-ﬂaw attack happens when a ﬁeld in a message that was originally intended
to have one type is interpreted as having another type.
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the purchased item to D. This scenario was checked using the Evaluator 3.0
model checker from the cadp toolset, conﬁrming that it is deadlock-free, and
eﬀective as speciﬁed below.
Result 1. Nuovo DRM is eﬀective for scenario S0, meaning that it satisﬁes the
following properties:
1. Each purchase request is inevitably responded.
∀m ∈ Cont, r ∈ Rgts. [T∗.request(C, m, r, P )] μX.(〈T〉T ∧ [¬update(C, m, r, P )]X)
∧
[T∗.request(D, m, r, C)] μX.(〈T〉T ∧ [¬update(D, m, r, C)]X)
2. Each received item is preceded by its payment.
∀m ∈ Cont, r ∈ Rgts.
[(¬issue(P, m, r, C))∗.update(C, m, r, P )]F ∧ [(¬issue(C, m, r, D))∗.update(D, m, r, C)]F
Dishonest scenario S1: The intruder controls the communication network
and is the owner of the compliant devices C and D. The intruder can instruct
the compliant devices to purchase items from the provider P , exchange items
between themselves and resolve a pending transaction. Moreover, the compliant
device C can non-deterministically choose between following or aborting the
protocol at each step, which models the ability of the intruder to turn the device
oﬀ (see I1 in Section 5.1). We model three concurrent runs of the content provider
P , and three sequential runs of each of C and D. The resulting model was checked
using the Evaluator 3.0 model checker from the cadp toolset and the following
results were proven.
Result 2. Nuovo DRM provides secrecy in scenario S1, i.e. no protected content
is revealed to the intruder (see Section 5.1).
∀m : Cont. [T∗.revealed(m)]F
Result 3. Nuovo DRM resists content masquerading attacks in S1, ensuring
that a compliant device only receives the content which it has requested.
∀a ∈ {C, D}, m ∈ Cont, r ∈ Rgts. [(¬request(C, m, r, D))∗.update(C, m, r, D)]F ∧
[(¬request(D, m, r, C))∗.update(D, m, r, C)]F ∧
[(¬request(a, m, r, P ))∗.update(a, m, r, P )]F.
Besides, the intruder cannot feed the self-fabricated content m0 to compliant
devices:
∀a ∈ {C, D}, r ∈ Rgts. [T∗.update(C, m0, r, D)]F ∧
[T∗.update(D, m0, r, C)]F ∧
[T∗.update(a, m0, r, P )]F.
Result 4. Nuovo DRM provides strong fairness in S1 for P , i.e. no compliant
device receives a protected content, unless the corresponding payment has been
made to P .
∀a ∈ {C, D}, m ∈ Cont, r ∈ Rgts. [(¬issue(P, m, r, a))∗.update(a, m, r, P )]F
∧
[T∗.update(a, m, r, P ).(¬issue(P, m, r, a))∗.
update(a, m, r, P )]F
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Result 5. Nuovo DRM provides strong fairness in S1 for D, as formalized be-
low7:
1. As a customer: if a compliant device pays (a provider or reseller device) for
a content, it will eventually receive it. 8
Note that there are only ﬁnitely many TTPs available in the model, so the
intruder, in principle, can keep all of them busy, preventing other participants
from resolving their pending transactions. This corresponds to a denial of
service attack in practice, which can be mitigated by putting time limits
on transactions with TTPs. As we abstract away from timing aspects here,
instead, the action lastttp is used to indicate that all TTPs in the model are
exhausted by the intruder. In other words, as long as this action has not
occurred yet, there is still at least one TTP available to resort to.
∀m ∈ Cont, r ∈ Rgts. [T∗.request(D, m, r, P ).(¬(update(D, m, r, P )))∗]
〈(¬com†(−,−,−))∗.(update(D, m, r, P ))〉T
∧
∀m ∈ Cont, r ∈ Rgts. [T∗.request(D, m, r, C).(¬(resolves(D) ∨ update(D, m, r, C)))∗]
〈(¬com†(−,−,−))∗.(resolves(D) ∨ update(D, m, r, C))〉T
∧
[(¬lastttp)∗.request(D, m, r, C).(¬lastttp)∗.resolves(D).
(¬(update(D, m, r, P ) ∨ lastttp))∗]
〈(¬com†(−,−,−))∗.update(D, m, r, P )〉T
2. As a reseller: no compliant device receives a content from a reseller device,
unless the corresponding payment has already been made to the reseller.
∀m ∈ Cont, r ∈ Rgts. [(¬issue(D, m, r, C))∗.update(C, m, r, D)]F
∧
[T∗.update(C, m, r, D).(¬issue(D, m, r, C))∗.update(C, m, r, D)]F
Note that the strong fairness notion that is formalized and checked here subsumes
the timeliness property of goal G4, simply because when D starts the resolve
protocol, which it can autonomously do, it always recovers to a fair state without
any help from C.
Theorem 1. Nuovo DRM achieves its design goals in scenarios S0 and S1.
Proof. G1 is achieved based on result 1. Result 2 implies G2. Result 3 guarantees
achieving G3. Results 4 and 5 guarantee G4.
6 Conclusions
We have formally analyzed the NPGCT DRM scheme and found two vulnera-
bilities in its protocols. The scheme is subsequently extended to address these
7 Strong fairness for C is not guaranteed here, as it can quit the protocol prematurely.
A protocol guarantees security only for the participants that follow the protocol.
8 The fairness constraint used in the formulas corresponds to the strong notion of
fairness in [33]: ∀θ. F ∞enabled(θ) ⇒ F ∞executed (θ).
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vulnerabilities. The extended scheme, namely Nuovo DRM, as many other DRM
systems, is inherently complicated and, thus, error prone. This calls for expressive
and powerful formal veriﬁcation tools to provide a certain degree of conﬁdence
in the security and fairness of the system. We have analyzed and validated our
design goals on a ﬁnite model of Nuovo DRM. There is of course no silver bullet:
our formal veriﬁcation is not complete as it abstracts away many details of the
system. For instance, as future work, we are considering analyzing the account-
ability of the provider, which is taken as non-disputable in this study, addressing
possible anonymity concerns of customers and incorporating the payment phase
into the formal model. We are currently working on a practical implementation
of Nuovo DRM using existing technologies, see [17].
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